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Information Leakage as a Model for Quality
of Anonymity Networks
Ye Zhu, Member, IEEE Computer Society, and Riccardo Bettati, Member, IEEE Computer Society
Abstract—Measures for anonymity in systems must be, on one hand, simple and concise and, on the other hand, reflect the realities of
real systems. Such systems are heterogeneous, as are the ways they are used, the deployed anonymity measures, and finally, the
possible attack methods. Implementation quality and topologies of the anonymity measures must be considered as well. We therefore
propose a new measure for the anonymity degree that takes into account these various aspects of design and operation of anonymity
systems. We model the effectiveness of single mixes or of mix networks in terms of information leakage, and we measure it in terms of
covert-channel capacity. The relationship between the anonymity degree and information leakage is described, and an example is shown.
Index Terms—Anonymity, covert channel, information leakage.
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INTRODUCTION

O

the recent years, we have experienced an increased
perceived need for various forms of privacy-preserving
communication settings, be it for pseudonymous publishing,
service hiding, or anonymous communication in general.
Many high-level privacy-preserving systems such as electro
nic cash, anonymous publishing, and others require a layer
that provides some form of anonymity-preserving commu
nication service in order to protect the identity of the
participants. Anonymous communication can be provided
in a number of forms: sender anonymity protects the identity of
the sender, while receiver anonymity protects that of the
receiver. Another form is sender-receiver anonymity (also
called unlinkability), which hides whether a given sender is
communicating with a given receiver. Based on these very
simple measures, more sophisticated privacy-preserving
schemes can be built. A large number of systems to support
such privacy-preserving communication have been proposed. Most common such systems rely on so-called mix
networks, which perturb the traffic in the network in order to
hide the participants in a communication. The traffic is
typically perturbed 1) in the payload domain, through
encryption, 2) in the routing domain, through rerouting,
and 3) in the timing domain, by randomly delaying packets
and by generating additional dummy traffic. The objective is
to prevent an observer from identifying the participants of a
conversation. Examples include Crowds [1] for anonymous
Web transactions, Freenet [2] for distributed anonymous
information storage and retrieval, Tarzan [3] for P2P
networking, and—most prominently—Tor for anonymous
communication generally and for service hiding [4].
VER
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In order to determine the participants in a communica
tion, the attacker cannot simply inspect the packet or the
packet header, since this information is hidden through
encryption and rerouting. More sophisticated typically
traffic-analysis-based techniques are required. Given the
importance of effective privacy-preserving communication
systems, the question of how to quantify the anonymity
provided by an anonymity system is of great relevance.
Researchers proposed various definitions to quantify
anonymity, such as anonymity set size [5], effective anonymity
set size [6], and entropy-based anonymity degree [7], all of
which measure the number of possible receivers or senders
of a message. While these metrics led to an increasingly
better understanding of anonymity, they tend to focus on
the anonymity of a single message under a single anonymity
attack. In practice, however, metrics that take into account
the realities of today’s use of networks are needed:
communication settings in real systems range from single
messages to message groups, voice-over-IP streams, and
FTP transfers. In addition, sophisticated attacks can resort to
a variety of techniques to break anonymity: flow correlation
attacks [8], intersection attacks [9], trickle attacks [10], and
so on. A number of out-of-the-box attacks have been
described to attack anonymity systems as well, such as
Murdoch’s clock-skew attack to locate hidden services [11].
A measure for the anonymity degree should satisfy a
number of requirements: First, the anonymity degree
should capture the quality of an anonymity system. It has
been shown, for example, that information-theoretical
means such as entropy are more accurate for comparing
anonymity systems than, say, anonymity sets. Second, the
anonymity degree should take into account the topology of
the network or that of any overlay defined by the
anonymity system. The topology influences how much
information an attacker can gather and thus has an impact
on the system anonymity degree. For example, a system of
fully connected nodes will provide a different level of
anonymity from a chain of nodes. Third, the anonymity
degree, as a measure of the effectiveness of the anonymity
system, should be independent of the number of users for

two reasons: 1) while a large number of users clearly
contributes to anonymity, this does not necessarily reflect
on the quality of the anonymity system, and 2) the
effectiveness of “hiding in a crowd” is not well understood.
For example, we have shown in [12] that crowds can be
partitioned through appropriate preconditioning of obser
vation data, e.g., by using Blind Source Separation.
Next, the anonymity measure must be independent of
the threat model, as attackers may use a variety of attack
techniques or combinations thereof to break the anonymity.
Finally, the anonymity degree should support the
engineering of anonymity networks. As such, it should
allow for composition of networks out of single mixes and
subnetworks with well understood anonymity degrees into
larger networks whose anonymity degree is well under
stood as well.
Since the goal of anonymity attacks is to infer the
communication relations in a system despite counter
measures, it is natural to model such attacks as covert
channels, and interest has focused on the interdependence
of anonymity and covert channels [13]. The designer of an
anonymity system generally faces the question of how
much information may leak from the anonymity network
given the unavoidable imperfectness of the latter and how
this may affect the anonymity degree. This information
leakage can be evaluated in form of a covert channel.
The major contributions of our study are summarized as
follows: First, we propose an anonymity degree to quantify
the anonymity provided by an anonymity network. This
definition generalizes the information-theoretic definitions
previously proposed in [6] and [7]. Then, we propose a new
class of covert channels, which we call anonymity-based
covert channels. We formally prove how to establish covert
channels of maximum capacity over a single mix based on
anonymity attacks on the mix. Finally, we use anonymitybased covert channels to assess the performance of mix
networks. We show how the capacity of anonymity-based
covert channels can be used to provide simple composable
descriptions of nonperfect mix networks and can be used to
formulate bounds on the provided anonymity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews the related work. Section 3 describes the proposed
anonymity degree and the relationship with other entropybased anonymity degree definitions. In Section 4, we define
the anonymity-based covert channel. Sections 5, 6, and 7
present the relationship between the covert-channel capa
city and anonymity degree for a single-mix case and mixnetwork case. Section 8 illustrates the results in the previous
sections by evaluating and comparing different design
decisions for a mix network. We conclude this paper and
discuss the future work in Section 9.

2

RELATED WORK

A large number of systems for anonymous communication
have been proposed and developed over the last few decades,
both for latency-tolerant and low-latency communication.
Chaum [14] pioneered the idea of anonymity in 1981. Since
then, researchers have applied the idea to different applica
tions such as message-based e-mail and flow-based lowlatency communications, and they have invented new

defense techniques as more attacks have been proposed.
For anonymous e-mail applications, Chaum proposed to use
relay servers, called mixes, that reroute messages. Messages
are encrypted to prevent their tracking by simple payload
inspection.
Helsingius [15] implemented the first Internet anon
ymous remailer, which is a single application proxy and
replaces the original e-mail’s source address with the
remailer’s address. Gülcü and Tsudik [16] developed a
relatively complete anonymous e-mail system, called Babel.
Cottrell [17] developed Mixmaster, which counters a global
passive attack by using message padding. It counters trickle
and flood attacks [16], [10] by using a pool batching strategy.
Danezis et al. [18] developed Mixminion. Mixminion’s
design considers a large set of attacks that researchers have
found [19], [10]. The authors suggest a list of research topics
for future study. Tor [4], the second-generation onion router,
has been developed for circuit-based low-latency anon
ymous communication recently. It can provide perfect
forward secrecy.
To evaluate the effectiveness of such anonymity systems
under anonymity attacks, a number of different anonymity
degree definitions have been proposed. The anonymity
degree proposed in [1] is defined as the probability of not
being identified by the attacker. It focuses on each user
separately and does not capture the anonymity of the whole
system. Berthold et al. [19] propose an anonymity degree
based on the number of the users of an anonymity system.
There is an ongoing debate about what is the role of the
number of users in providing anonymity. Intuitively, the
larger the crowd, the easier it is for an individual to hide in
it. In practice, however, attacks proceed by isolating users
or groups of users that are more likely to be participants in a
communication. This was first considered in the anonymity
set, introduced in [20]. The anonymity set describes the set
of suspected senders or receivers of a message. The size of
the anonymity set is used in [5] as the anonymity degree.
A big step forward was done by Serjantov and Danezis [6]
and by Diaz et al. [7] by proposing anonymity measures that
consider probability distributions in the anonymity set. Both
measures are based on entropy and can differentiate two
anonymity sets that have identical sizes but different
distributions. The measure in [7] normalizes the anonymity
degree to discount for the anonymity set size.
A number of efforts have studied the relation between
covert channels and anonymity systems. Moskowitz et al. [21]
focus on the covert channel over a mix-firewall between two
enclaves. The covert channel in this case is established by the
channel receiver determining whether an anonymized
sender is transmitting packets. Newman et al. [22] focus on
the covert channel over a timed mix. The authors in [13] make
a series of excellent observations about the relation between
covert channels and anonymity systems. They illustrate this
relation by describing the linkage between the lack of
complete anonymity (quasianonymity) and the covert com
munication over different types of mixes. Finally, they
propose to use this covert-channel capacity as a metric for
anonymity.
The work presented in this paper takes a system-level view
of covert channels and anonymity and differs from previous
work such as [13], [21], and [22] in two ways. First, we assume

A number of attacks have been described recently that give
rise to moderately high-capacity channels on mixes. Several
attacks to simple mixes lend themselves to an accurate
analysis of the exploited covert channels, such as in [13],
[21], and [22]. For other attacks, the covert-channel capacity
can be merely estimated, using statistical means. Examples
are intersection attacks [9], timing attacks [23], Danezis’s
attack on the continuous mixes [24], and the flow correla
tion attack [8]. The timing attack [23] uses cross-correlation
to match flows given the packet time stamps of the flow.
Danezis’s attack on the continuous mix [24] uses likelihood
ratios to detect a flow in aggregate traffic. The flow
correlation attack [8] employs statistical methods to detect
TCP flows in aggregate traffic. The flow correlation attack
can achieve high detection rates for all the mixes described
in [10] and for continuous mixes.

We model an attack to such a node in terms of its
effectiveness in determining who is talking to whom: the set
of probabilities pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ denotes the probability
that communication ½su ; rv ]s is suspected, given that com
munication ½si ; rj ]a is actually taking place. In other words, a
probability pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ denotes the probability of
erroneously suspecting su sending to rv when in actuality
si is sending to rj . This model lends itself to accurate
descriptions of many different attacks, as the probability
pð½·; ·]s j½·; ·]a Þ can be defined based on the observation of
single packets, a number of packets, a flow, or a session,
depending on the particular attack method used.
For example, the passive attack described in [25]
successfully determines a flow when the flow is alone on
a link. Therefore, the probability pð½si ; rj ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ of
correctly identifying communication ½si ; rj ] is equal to the
chance that the flow is alone on the output link from the mix
to receiver rj . Alternatively, for Danezis’s attack on the
continuous mix [24], the probability pð½si ; rj ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ is the
probability that the likelihood of the hypothesis assuming
that the flow of interest is going through the link between
the mix and receiver rj is greater than any other hypothesis,
assuming that the flow of interest is going to any other
receiver. Finally, for the flow correlation attack [8], the
probability of pð½si ; rj ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ is equal to the probability
that the mutual information between the flow of interest
and the aggregate traffic on the link between the mix and
receiver rj is larger than the mutual information between
the flow of interest and the aggregate traffic on any other
outgoing link.
We note that the attacker may use different attack
methods to estimate the probability pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ for
different communications on different mixes or even on the
same mix. In addition, a priori information that the attacker
may gather about potential participants can be included as
well. For example, the presence of dummy traffic may
indicate the existence of some anonymized traffic. Similarly,
some active participants are known to have communicated
in the past, which may reflect on their a priori probability
that they are communicating in the present.
The model above describes attacks on sender-receiver
anonymity, where both the sender and the receiver are
anonymous. It can be easily extended to sender anonymity
or receiver anonymity, that is, cases where the sender only
or the receiver only is anonymous, respectively. For
example, we can describe the results of a sender-anonymity
attack in terms of pð½su ; *]s j½si ; *]a Þ or just pð½su ]s j½si ]a Þ. To
keep the following discussion simple and general, we will
focus on sender-receiver anonymity, with the understand
ing that sender anonymity or receiver anonymity can be
modeled just as well.

3.1 Attack Model
We model a single mix (Fig. 1) as a communication node that
connects m senders S ¼ ðs1 ; s2 ; s3 ; . . . ; sm Þ to n receivers
R ¼ ðr1 ; r2 ; r3 ; . . . ; rn Þ. Every sender si may communicate to
every receiver rj . We say that a communication exists between
si and rj whenever si communicates to rj . A communication
between si and rj is denoted by the term ½si ; rj ]. It can consist
of either a single packet being sent or of an established flow.

3.2 Proposed Anonymity Degree
We define a new measure D for the anonymity degree
based on the following rationale: Let the random variable
½S; R]a indicate the actual sender and receiver pair and the
random variable ½S; R]s in turn indicate the suspected sender
and receiver pair. If the attack identifies the communicating
pairs with high accuracy, then the dependence between the
two random variables ½S; R]a and ½S; R]s will be high.

Fig. 1. Model of a mix.

that the existence of various sources of information leakage in
the elements (mixes, batchers, padders, . . . ) of an anonymity
system are a reality that system designers and operators have
to deal with. Some of the resulting covert channels can be
identified and either measured or analyzed using the
techniques described in [21] and [22]. Statistical techniques
can be used as well, as we describe in Section 3. In addition,
any cautious anonymity system designer or operator must
assume that mixes presumed to be perfect are not so, even if
the particular weakness is not known a priori. In this paper,
we use covert-channel capacity as a generic measure to model
weaknesses (known or unknown) in the anonymity system
infrastructure. This gives a tool for designers or operators to
uniformly describe both known weaknesses (i.e., results of
attacks) or merely suspected ones and to analyze their effect
on the anonymity provided by the system. Second, the
anonymity degree of the mix network is a result of systemlevel effects: changes in the user population or application mix
affect the anonymity provided and so do topology of the
anonymity system and routing preferences within the system.
As a result, there is no one-to-one mapping from the
anonymity degree to covert-channel capacities of elements
in a mix network and vice versa. In this paper, we investigate
the relationship between anonymity degree and covertchannel capacity in terms of what effect one has on the other.

3

ANONYMITY DEGREE

In general, the dependence of two random variables can
be measured using the mutual information of the two
random variables. The mutual information IðX; Y Þ of two
random variables X and Y is a function of the entropies of
X and Y as follows:
IðX; Y Þ ¼ HðXÞ - HðXjY Þ:

ð1Þ

Therefore, the effectiveness of an attack can be described
in terms of the mutual information Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ.
To give a more figurative interpretation of mutual
information as a measure of the attack effectiveness, we
use an analogy to communication channels: mutual infor
mation is typically used to describe the amount of
information sent across a channel from a sender X to a
receiver Y , where HðXÞ is the information at the input of the
channel, and HðXjY Þ describes the information attenuation
caused by the noise on the channel. (See [26] for an easy-to
read introduction to the information theory used in this
context.) This gives an intuition of why mutual information
describes the effectiveness of an anonymity attack. Let
½S; R]a be the random variable that describes the actual
sender and receiver pair. Let an attacker’s estimate of ½S; R]a
through observation of the system be ½S; R]s . The informa
tion carried through the observation channel provided by an
attack is therefore Ið½S; R]a ; ðS; R]s Þ. The higher this carried
information, the more accurate the anonymity attack.1 Using
the textbook definition for entropy, the effectiveness of an
anonymity attack can be described as follows:
(
)
(
)
(
)
I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s ¼ H ½S; R]a - H ½S; R]a j½S; R]s
(
)
X (
) p ½s; r]s j½s; r]a
(
) :
¼
p ½s; r]a ; ½s; r]s log
p ½s; r]s
½s;r] ;½s;r]
a

s

ð2Þ
In (2), we P
let pð½s; r]a ; ½s; r]s Þ ¼ pð½s; r]a Þpð½s; r]s j½s; r]a Þ and
pð½s; r]s Þ ¼ ½s;r]a pð½s; r]a ; ½s; r]s Þ. We let pð½s; r]a Þ denote the
a priori probability of s communicating to r, typically
derived from the expected traffic from s to r.
We can now formulate the anonymity degree D as a
function of the attack effectiveness as follows:
(
)
I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s
D¼1:
ð3Þ
logðm · nÞ
Since Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ � Hð½S; R]a Þ � logðm · nÞ, we use
logðm · nÞ to normalize the anonymity degree into the range
of [0, 1] in (3). Alternatively, one could choose Hð½S; R]a Þ as
the normalization factor. However, the latter depends on the
a priori probability of communication between each pair of
sender and receiver. The impact of this a priori probability
has been taken into account by the term pð½s; r]a Þ in (2).
The equality Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ ¼ Hð½S; R]a Þ holds when
perfect identification of the sender-receiver pair is achieved,
that is, pð½si ; rj ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ ¼ 1 for each pair of sender and
receiver. This corresponds to the situation where anonymity
is totally broken, in which case the anonymity degree
measure D is zero.
1. Strictly speaking, we measure the upper bound over all anonymity
attacks. If an attack is biased and consistently makes wrong decisions, some
other attack may make consistently better decisions.

Fig. 2. Single-mix scenario.

On the other hand, the anonymity degree D is one
whenever no information about sender-receiver relation
ships can be gathered in addition to a priori information: in
this case, Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ ¼ 0.

3.3

Relationship to Previous Anonymity Degree
Definitions
The anonymity degree definition D is a generalization of the
entropy-based definitions proposed in [6] and [7]. In fact,
we can rewrite the attack effectiveness Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ as
(
)
(
)
(
)
I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s ¼ H ½S; R]s - H ½S; R]s j½S; R]a
(
)
¼ H ½S; R]s
X (
) (
)
p ½s; r]a H ½S; R]s j½S; R]a ¼ ½s; r]a :
½s;r]a

ð4Þ
In (4), the term Hð½S; R]s j½S; R]a ¼ ½s; r]a Þ represents the
conditional entropy of the suspected sender-receiver pair
distribution given the communication ½s; r]. This corre
sponds to the anonymity degree definition described in [6]
and also to the core of the anonymity degree defined in [7].
In our mutual-information-based anonymity degree, the
entropy-based degree is included by averaging according to
pð½s; r]a Þ, the a priori probability of traffic between each pair.
In comparison to the entropy-based definitions above, our
proposed definition describes the anonymity provided by a
network of mixes.

4

ANONYMITY-BASED COVERT CHANNELS

Less-than-perfect anonymity systems give rise to a form of
covert channel that is exploited by anonymity attacks. We
call this form of covert channel an anonymity-based covert
channel. The input symbols of this type of covert channel
are the actual sender-receiver pairs ½s; r]a , and the channel
output symbols are the suspected sender-receiver pairs ½s; r]s .
The channel transition probability pð½s; r]s j½s; r]a Þ (i.e., the
probability that ½s; r]s is suspected as communication given
that ½s; r]a is the actual communication) describes the result
of the anonymity attack.
We use the simple scenario shown in Fig. 2 as an
example. We assume that the attacker can collect data at the
output ports of the mix as well as some additional
information about incoming traffic from the senders. The
details on how this information is collected and evaluated
depend on the particular attack. (We described a few
examples in Section 3.1.) Given sufficient collected data, the
attacker can detect individual communications such as

can be used to establish the type of anonymity-based covert
channels described in this paper.

5

Fig. 3. Anonymity-based covert-channel model.

½s2 ; r2 ] with some non-negligible probability, despite the
anonymity-preserving countermeasures in the mix.
The fact that the attacker is able to gain information
about communications indicates that a covert channel of the
following form exists: A covert-channel sender can send a
symbol by establishing a communication from some sender
s2 to receiver r1 and send another symbol by establishing a
communication from sender s2 to another receiver r2 . The
covert-channel receiver can use the anonymity attack to
detect the flow’s direction and then make the decision. The
channel model is as shown in Fig. 3. For the sake of
simplicity, in this example, we limit the covert-channel
sender to establishing communications from sender s2 .
Allowing communications from sender s1 increases the set
of input symbols accordingly.
We compute the capacity of the (anonymity-based)
covert channel in a textbook fashion by maximizing the
mutual information over all input symbol distributions:
(
)
C ¼ max I ½s2 ; R]a ; ½s2 ; R]s
pð½s2 ;r]a Þ
¼ max
pð½s2 ;r]a Þ

2 X
2
X
i¼1 j¼1

(
)
p ½s2 ; ri ]a ; ½s2 ; rj ]s

SINGLE-MIX CASE

In a mix with a single sender s1 , a covert-channel sender can
establish a covert channel by having s1 communicate with
any combination of j among the n receivers. For this covert
channel, the set of input symbols is f½s1 ; rk ]a : 1 � k � ng,
and the set of output symbols is f½su ; rv ]s : 1 � u � m;
1 � v � ng. We can include all communications into the set
of output symbols because the improbability of any
particular communication being declared as suspected by
a particular attack can be appropriately reflected by a zero
transition probability.
Pn (n)
different covert channels can be
Therefore,
j¼1 j
established. Similarly, if the covert-channel sender has
cont rol o ve r mult i ple se n de rs, there ar e a t l east
Pm (m) Pn (n)
different covert channels that
can be
i¼1 i
j¼1 j
Pm (m) Pn (n)
established. Which of these
covert
i¼1 i
j¼1 j
channels has the maximum capacity?
Lemma 1. For a single sender si on a single mix, the maximum
covert-channel capacity is achieved when si can communicate
to all receivers.
Proof. By having si communicate to all receivers, the covertchannel sender can send all the possible symbols ½si ; rj ]a ,
1 � j � n. We call this covert channel x. By definition, the
capacity of channel x is the maximal mutual information
over the
Pdistributions pð½si ; r1 ]a Þ, pð½si ; r2 ]a Þ; · · · ; pð½si ; rn ]a Þ,
where nj¼1 pð½si ; rj ]a Þ ¼ 1, that is
(
)
max
I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s :
ð6Þ
Cx ¼
pð½si ;r1 ]a Þ;pð½si ;r2 ]a Þ;

ð5Þ

(
)
p ½s2 ; rj ]a ; ½s2 ; ri ]s
) (
) :
· log (
p ½s2 ; ri ]a p ½s2 ; rj ]s

While the previously defined anonymity degree D only
incidentally has an information-theoretic definition, the
similarity between the anonymity degree D and the
capacity of the anonymity-based covert channel is not
accidental: The anonymity degree D describes the “ex
pected” information leakage through an anonymity net
work, whereas the anonymity-based covert channel
describes the leakage that is maximally achievable by
carefully controlling the communication patterns through
the network. The channel capacity C therefore describes a
low bound on the “quality” of the anonymity network. We
will describe in the following how to derive the provided
anonymity degree D from a bound on C and what “quality”
levels are needed to reach a predefined anonymity level D.
The covert channels previously proposed in the context
of mix networks [13], [21], [22] are not anonymity based in
the sense described above, as the signal is not received
across the channel as a result of an anonymity attack.
Rather, they describe information leakage in low-level
mechanisms that are used to realize mixes, such as the
batching mechanisms in [13] and [21]. These covert channels
are then exploited by the anonymity attacks, which in turn

···;pð½si ;rn ]a Þ

The range of the max operator in (6) (and the value
for Cx ) is clearly maximized when si can communicate to
all receivers, and therefore, none of the pð½si ; rj ]a Þ is zero.
Hence, the capacity of channel x communicating to all
receivers is larger or equal to the capacity of all other
covert channels that communicate to only a subset of
receivers.
u
t
Theorem 1. For a single mix, the maximum covert-channel
capacity is achieved when the covert-channel sender controls
all the senders s1 ; s2 ; . . . ; sm and the input symbols of the
corresponding channel include all the possible pairs ½si ; rj ]a .
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the same approach as the
proof of Lemma 1.
From Theorem 1, we can derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1. For the single-mix model shown in Fig. 1, the
maximum covert-channel capacity is
C ¼ max Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ:
pð½s;r]a Þ

From Corollary 1 and (3), we derive the relationship
between the quality of a single mix (i.e., the capacity of any
covert channel that allows information to leak from the mix)
and its anonymity degree. (Note that this relationship is

trivial for the single-mix case. However, we make use of this
result in the analysis of networks of mixes.)
Lemma 2. Given a single mix with a potential maximum
information leakage that is upper bounded by Cupper , the
anonymity degree of the single mix is lower bounded by
C
1 - log upper
ðm·nÞ . Similarly, given that the anonymity degree
provided by a single mix is upper bounded by Dupper , the
maximum information leakage of the mix is lower bounded by
ð1 - Dupper Þ log ðm · nÞ.
Proof. If the covert-channel capacity is upper bounded
by Cupper
(
)
I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s
D ¼1logðm · nÞ
C
>1logðm · nÞ
Cupper
:
>1logðm · nÞ
If the anonymity degree is upper-bounded by Dupper ,
( (
))
C ¼ max I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s
(
)
> I ½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s
¼ ð1 - DÞ logðm · nÞ
> ð1 - Dupper Þ logðm · nÞ:
t
u
Lemma 2 describes how the design and implementation
quality of a mix affects effectiveness. In the following
sections, we will describe this relation for the case of mix
networks.

6

MIX-NETWORK CASE

6.1 Anonymity Degree of a Mix Network
We generalize the anonymity degree for a single mix defined
in (3) to the network case by observing that the effectiveness
of a mix network can be represented similarly to that of a
“supermix.” Let RM and SM represent the set of senders and
receivers of the supermix, respectively. The anonymity
degree of the supermix (and of the mix network) is
(
)
I ½SM ; RM ]a ; ½SM ; RM ]s
D¼1;
ð7Þ
logðm · nÞ
where similar to the single-mix case
(
)
I ½SM ; RM ]a ; ½SM ; RM ]s
¼

X
½si ;rj ]a ;½su ;rv ]s

)!
(
(
)
p ½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a
(
)
p ½si ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s · log
:
p ½su ; rv ]s
ð8Þ

Ið½SM ; RM ]a ; ½SM ; RM ]s Þ is determined by pð½si ; rj ]a Þ and
pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ, where probability pð½si ; rj ]a Þ is the pro
portion of traffic between si and rj , and the probability
pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ is determined by the results of the
anonymity attack at one or more mixes in the mix network.
In the following sections, we describe how to make use of

the single-mix attack result to describe the effectiveness of a
mix network.

6.2 Effectiveness of Single Mix versus Supermix
In the following, we use the term ph ð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ to
represent the transition probabilities that are the result of
some anonymity attack on mix Mh and pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ to
represent the end-to-end transition probability for the supermix. Without loss of generality, we assume in the following
that the supermix transition probability we are interested in is
pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ. The process to determine the relationship
between ph ð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ and pð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ can be
divided into three steps.
Step 1. Find the set Puv of all the possible paths between
su and rv . Clearly,
)
X (
(
)
p ½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a ¼
ð9Þ
p ½su ; rv ]s;Pa j½si ; rj ]a ;
Pa 2Puv

where pð½su ; rv ]s;Pa j½si ; rj ]a Þ denotes the probability of sus
pecting communication ½si ; rj ]a to be communication ½su ; rv ]s
over path Pa . Note that the actual communication between si
and rj takes only one path, which we call path P0 .
Step 2. Determine the probability of suspecting an actual
communication over path P0 to be the communication over
another path Pa . Depending on how path Pa and path P0
overlap, we distinguish three situations: 1) there is only one
segment where the two paths overlap, 2) the two paths
share multiple segments, and 3) there is no overlap between
the two paths. Since there is no overlap in situation 3, the
probability of suspecting a communication over path P0 to
be the communication over path Pa is zero. Hence, we only
need to further pursue situations 1 and 2.
Situation 1 can be divided into four subcases.
Case 1. P0 and Pa are identical. This implies that su ¼ si
and rv ¼ rj . In this case, the probability of suspecting
correctly is the product of the probabilities of locally
suspecting correctly at all mixes along path P0 . If we denote
the mixes on path P0 to be M1 ; M2 ; . . . ; Ml , then
(
)
(
)
p ½si ; rj ]s;P0 j½si ; rj ] ¼ p1 ½si ; M2 ]s j½si ; M2 ]a
!
l-1
Y
(
)
ð10Þ
·
pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ] j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]
s

a

d¼2

(
)
· pl ½Ml-1 ; rj ]s j½Ml-1 ; rj ]a :
This follows directly from the fact that correct guesses at
each mix on the path cause the attacker to correctly suspect
the actual path.
Case 2. P0 and Pa share the same path from si through
the first mix M1 to some mix Ml and then diverge due to an
error at mix Ml . This is illustrated in Fig. 4, where in order
to emphasize the path P0 and Pa , other possible connections
among the mixes and other possible mixes are ignored. The
fact that P0 and Pa share the same path from si means that si
is correctly suspected, i.e., su ¼ si .
In this subcase, the probability of erroneously suspecting
some receiver rv other than rj is the result of correctly
identifying the path up to some mix Ml-1 and then making
a mistake at mix Ml . Once an error has been made, the
remaining mixes on the path to any erroneously suspected

Fig. 4. Case 2.

Fig. 5. Case 3.

receiver rv are not on path P0 . According to the attack
model described in Section 3, no differentiation can be
made between rv and any other receiver that can be reached
after making an error at mix Ml . We therefore aggregate all
receivers that can be reached after an error at mix Ml into
ij
what we call a cloud of receivers. We denote by Cl=q
the
cloud that is a result of an error at mix Ml , where
communication ½si ; rj ]a is incorrectly identified because
port q was erroneously selected instead of the port taken
by ½si ; rj ]a . For the example in Fig. 4, the probability of
ij
suspecting a receiver to be inside cloud Cl=q
is
(h
i
)
(
)
ij
j½si ; rj ] ¼ p1 ½si ; M2 ]s j½si ; M2 ]a
p si ; Cl=q
s
!
l-1
Y
(
)
ð11Þ
·
pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a

the situation in Fig. 5, the probability of suspecting
ij
communication ½Cl=q
; rj ]s is
(h
i
)
(
)
ij
p Cl=q
; rj j½si ; rj ] ¼ p1 ½si ; M2 ]s j½si ; M2 ]a
s
!
l-1
Y
(
)
·
pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a

d¼2

(h
i
)
ij
j½Ml-1 ; rj ]a :
· pl Ml-1 ; Cl=q
s

Since we are only interested in receivers in the cloud, we call
ij
Cl=q
a receiver cloud in this case. Whenever the context
requires, we distinguish between sender clouds and
receiver clouds, denoted SC and RC, respectively. We
aggregate receivers into clouds because without additional
evidence about the actual flow, it is impossible to
differentiate suspects in a cloud by assigning different
probabilities. More sophisticated anonymity attacks may
make it possible to better differentiate receivers and senders
in local attacks on mixes. In such a case, we would modify
our detector model and extend (11) accordingly. In some
cases, a cloud can consist of a single receiver or sender.
The dashed line between mix Ml and receiver rj in Fig. 4
is to emphasize that the existence of intermediate mixes
after Ml will not further contribute to suspecting commu
ij
]s .
nication ½si ; rj ]a as communication ½si ; Cl=q
Case 3. P0 and Pa share the same path from some
mix Ml to the receiver. Similar to Case 2, we introduce a
ij
sender cloud Cl=q
, which is connected to the (input) port q of
mix Ml . Since the anonymity attacks from mix M1 to mix
Ml-1 may make a wrong decision to suspect communica
tion ½si ; rj ]a as communications from senders attached to
mixes M1 to Ml-1 , the probability of suspecting commu
nication ½si ; rj ]a as communications from senders attached
to the mixes after Ml-1 will be p1 ð½si ; M2 ]s j½si ; M2 ]a Þ ·
Q
ð l-1
d¼2 pd ð½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a ÞÞ. T he n , a w ro ng
guess at mix Ml and correct guesses till the end of path
ij
will result in the suspected communication ½SCl=q
; rj ]s . For

d¼2

(h
i
)
ij
; Mlþ1 j½Ml-1 ; Mlþ1 ]a
· pl Cl=q

ð12Þ

s

L-1
Y

·

(

pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a

)

!

d¼lþ1

(
)
· pL ½ML-1 ; rj ]s j½ML-1 ; rj ]a :
Case 4. P0 and Pa only share their path in middle of each
path, as shown in Fig. 6.
In this case, we combine Cases 2 and 3 as follows:
(h
i
)
(
)
ij
ij
p SCl=p
; RCL=q
j½si ; rj ] ¼ p1 ½si ; M2 ]s j½si ; M2 ]a
s
!
l-1
Y
(
)
·
pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a
d¼2

· pl

(h

i
)
ij
SCl=p
; Mlþ1 j½Ml-1 ; Mlþ1 ]a
s

L-1
Y

·

(
)
pd ½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]s j½Md-1 ; Mdþ1 ]a

ð13Þ
!

d¼lþ1

· pL

(h

i
)
ij
ML-1 ; RCL=q
j½ML-1 ; rj ]a :
s

We point out that Cases 1, 2, and 3 can all be regarded as
special cases of Case 4. In Case 1, both sender cloud and
receiver clouds have only one sender and one receiver,
respectively. In Case 2, the sender cloud has only one sender,
while in Case 3, the receiver cloud has only one receiver.
Situation 2 can have two or more overlaps between
path P0 and Pa . However, the attacker loses the ability to

Fig. 6. Case 4.

infer anything about communication ½si ; rj ]a after the first
mistake, where the two paths split. All the nodes reachable
after the first mistake have to be aggregated in a receiver
cloud. This situation is therefore no different than the
single-overlap situation described above.
ij
ij
The result of Step 2 is the probability pð½SCl=p
; RCL=q
]s j
½si ; rj ]Þ of suspecting communication ½si ; rj ]a as communica
ij
ij
tion ½SCl=p
; RCL=q
]s .
Step 3. In Steps 1 and 2, we determined pathdependent end-to-end transition probabilities of the form
ij
ij
; RCL=q
]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ from the local transition prob
pð½SCl=p
abilities at the mixes. This allows us to determine the
end-to-end transition probabilities of the supermix (and
—as a side result—the anonymity degree of the mix
network) by solving the following optimization problem:
Given
local transition probabilities ph ð½·]s j½·]a Þ at each
mix Mh in the network,
ij
;
. path-dependent transition probabilities pð½SCl=p
ij
RCL=q ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ, and
. traffic volume in form of a priori probability
pð½si ; rj ]a Þ.
Objective function. Minimize the anonymity degree D
in (3). This is equivalent to maximizing the mutual
information Ið½S; R]a ; ½S; R]s Þ in (2).
Constraints. The optimization problem is subject to the
following three sets of constraints:
[Constraint set 1]. The sum of all path-independent
transition probabilities to all the end nodes in a group of
clouds is identical to the sum of path-dependent end-to-end
transition probabilities to the clouds in the group. For
simplicity of notation, we formulate this for the special case
of a correctly suspected sender si . The extension to the
general case is cumbersome, but straightforward. Let GRi;j
v
be the smallest set of receiver clouds that contain rv and all
receivers in GRi;j
v :
X (
)
8rv :
p ½si ; rw ]s j½si ; rj ]a
.

rw 2GRi;j
v

X

¼

p

i;j
RCl=q
2GRvi;j

h
i
i;j
si ; RCl=q

s;Pb

ð14Þ
j½si ; rj ]a :

[Constraint set 2]. The sum of all path-independent
transition probabilities to a subgroup of receivers is larger
than the sum of the path-dependent end-to-end transition
probabilities to clouds that only contain the receivers in the
subgroup. This is true because one receiver in the subgroup
may be contained in another cloud that contains the
receivers not in the subgroup. Let Rsub be a subset of the
set R of all receivers. Define HRi;jsub to be the set of all clouds
that contain only receivers in Rsub . For the simple case of a
correctly suspected sender si
X (
)
p ½si ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a
8Rsub :
rv 2Rsub

>

X

(
)
i;j
]s;Pb j½si ; rj ]a :
p ½si ; RCl=q

ð15Þ

i;j
RCl=q
2HRi;j
sub

[Constraint set 3]. The sum of all path-independent
transition probabilities to a subgroup of receivers is less

Fig. 7. A small example.

than the sum of the path-dependent end-to-end transition
probabilities to those clouds that have at least one
receiver in the subgroup. This holds because these clouds
may have other receivers that are not in the subgroup.
Let Rsub be a subset of the set R of all receivers. Define
IRi;jsub to be the set of all clouds that contains at least one of
the receivers in Rsub . We can conclude that
X (
)
8Rsub :
p ½si ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a
rv 2Rsub

�

(
)
i;j
p ½si ; RCl=q
]s;Pb j½si ; rj ]a :

X

ð16Þ

i;j
RCl=q
2IRi;j

sub

[Constraint set 4]. The end-to-end transition probabilities
for all suspects for all actual communications sum up to 1:
X (
)
8i; j
ð17Þ
p ½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a ¼ 1:
su ;rv

The solution of this optimization problem is the set of the
end-to-end transition probabilities of the supermix that
minimize the anonymity degree of the mix network.

6.3 A Small Example
We use the example mix network displayed in Fig. 7 to
illustrate how to compute end-to-end transition probabil
ities as described in Step 2 of Section 6.2.
We focus on communication ½s1 ; r1 ]. Suppose the actual
communication takes the route P0 : s1 ! M1 ! M3 !
M5 ! r1 . In this case, the probability of (erroneously)
suspecting communications ½s1 ; r3 ] is computed as follows:
(
)
(
)
p ½s1 ; r3 ]s j½s1 ; r1 ]a ¼ p1 ½s1 ; M3 ]s j½s1 ; M3 ]a
(
)
ð18Þ
· p3 ½M1 ; r3 ]s j½M1 ; M3 ]a :
This computation is simple, since there is only one path
from s1 to r3 .
The situation of (correctly) suspecting communication
½s1 ; r1 ]a is more complicated, because two paths can be
taken. One is P0 : s1 ! M1 ! M3 ! M5 ! r1 , and the other
is P1 : s1 ! M1 ! M4 ! M5 ! r1 . Clearly, we have
(
)
(
)
p ½s1 ; r1 ]s;P0 j½s1 ; r1 ] ¼ p1 ½s1 ; M3 ]s j½s1 ; M3 ]a
(
)
ð19Þ
· p3 ½M1 ; M5 ]s j½M1 ; M5 ]a
(
)
· p5 ½M3 ; r1 ]s j½M3 ; M1 ]a
of suspecting ½s1 ; r1 ] over path P0 .
For path P1 , we cannot get expression pð½s1 ; r1 ]s;P1 j½s1 ; r1 ]a Þ
directly in terms of anonymity attack result at mixes, because

the wrong guess at mix M1 will possibly lead to two receivers
r1 and r2 . Therefore, we have to aggregate receivers r1 and r2
1;1
in receiver cloud C1=q
, where q denotes the wrongly selected
output port at mix M1 . Therefore, what we can get is
(h
i
)
(
)
1;1
j½s1 ; r1 ]a ¼ p1 ½s1 ; M4 ]s j½s1 ; M1 ]a ;
ð20Þ
p s1 ; C1=q
s

where the erroneous selection of port q on mix M1 leads to the
suspected path s1 ! M1 ! M4 . Clearly, both receiver r1 and
receiver r2 can be reached after selecting port q on mix M1 .
In turn, by following (14), we can get
(
)
(
)
p ½s1 ; r1 ]s j½s1 ; r1 ]a þ p ½s1 ; r2 ]s j½s1 ; r1 ]a
(
)
(
)
¼ p1 ½s1 ; M4 ]s j½s1 ; M1 ]a þ p1 ½s1 ; M3 ]s j½s1 ; M3 ]a
(
)
ð21Þ
· p3 ½M1 ; M5 ]s j½M1 ; M5 ]a
(
)
· p5 ½M3 ; r1 ]s j½M3 ; M1 ]a :
After repeating this for all possible sender-receiver pairs,
expressions for the end-to-end transition can be formulated,
and the optimization described in Step 3 of Section 6.2 can
be used to determine the anonymity degree of the network.

7

COVERT-CHANNEL CAPACITY VERSUS
ANONYMITY DEGREE IN MIX NETWORKS

The analysis of the effectiveness of anonymity networks is
rendered difficult for two reasons primarily: First, attacks on
such networks are typically out-of-the-box attacks (for
example, none of the intersection attacks, trickle attacks, or
others target measures taken by the mix network). Second, it
is unknown where and how traffic information is collected. Is
the attack targeting individual mixes or clusters of mixes? Is
the information collected on a per-mix or a per-link basis?
In this section, we describe how the anonymity in mix
networks can be systematically analyzed and bounded
based on estimates of either per-mix weakness (using local
covert channels) or the entire mix network (using networkwide covert channels). For this purpose, we investigate the
relation between the covert-channel capacity of a mix
network and the anonymity provided by the network.

7.1

Upper Bound on the Covert-Channel Capacity in
Mix Networks
Let the mix network have K mixes. For Mix Mh , we use Sh
and Rh to represent the set of senders and receivers of
mix Mh , respectively. Any anonymity attack on mix Mh will
lead to a set of probabilities of the form ph ð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ
with su and si in Sh and rv and rj in Rh .
In a mix network, there are various ways to establish covert
channels. For example, in the mix network shown in Fig. 8,
there are at least two ways to establish the covert channels
using the two mixes MA and MB . One way is to establish one
covert channel on MA and MB separately. Alternatively, one
can establish a covert channel on the supermix containing
both MA and MB . We assume each mix can only be contained
in one covert channel as before. In the following, we use the
notation ccðMÞ to denote the covert channel that can be
established over the set of the mixes M. If we denote the
capacities of ccðfMA gÞ and ccðfMB gÞ to be CA and CB ,
respectively, then the sum of the covert-channel capacity
clearly is CA þ CB . We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The capacity of ccðfMA ; MB gÞ will be no greater than
CA þ CB .

Fig. 8. Mix network of two mixes.

Proof. The input and output alphabet of ccðfMA gÞ are
f½s; r]a : s 2 SA ; r 2 RA g, where SA ¼ fs1 ; s2 ; · · · ; smA ; MB g,
and RA ¼ fr1 ; r2 ; · · · ; rnA ; MB g. Please note that mix MB
can be both a sender and a receiver for mix MA and vice
versa. We can construct a new channel v1 from
ccðfMA gÞ with reduced set of input symbols. The input
symbols of channel v1 are f½s; r]a : s 2 SA - fMB g;
S
r 2 RA g f½MB ; MB ]a g. According to Theorem 1, the
capacity of ccðfMA gÞ will be no less than the capacity of
channel v1 .
Now, we consider the following covert channel v2 .
The covert-channel sender of v2 controls all the senders
s 2 SA - fMB g attached to mix MA to communicate
S with
any receiver r attached to both mixes, r 2 RA RB MA g. Let I2 denote
fMA ; MB g, where RB ¼ fr01 ; r02 ; . . . ; r0nB ;S
the set f½s; r]a : s 2 SA -fMB g; r 2 RA RB -fMA ; MB gg.
Assuming the covert-channel sender can also send the
symbol
½MB ; MB ]a , t he input symbols o f v2 are
S
I2 f½MB ; MB ]a g. The receiver of the covert channel v2
can only observe all the links connected to mix MA .
Therefore, the channel output symbols are f½s; r]s : s 2 SA ;
r 2 RA g. The transition probability for channel v2 is fully
determined by the anonymity attack on mix MA . For
example, for input symbol ½s1 ; r1 ]a and output symbol
½s1 ; r1 ]s , the transition probability is pMA ð½s1 ; r1 ]s j½s1 ; r1 ]a Þ.
Please note that
(
(
h
i )
[
J )
p ½s1 ; rx ]s j s1 ; ri0 a ¼ p ½s1 ; rx ]s j s1 ; rj0
a
ð22Þ
(
)
¼ pMA ½s1 ; rx ]s j½s1 ; MB ]a ;
where rx 2 RA , r0i 2 RB , and r0j 2 RB .
We can observe that because of (22), we can get channel
v1 by aggregating channel v2 ’s input symbols ½sx ; r01 ]a ;
½sx ; r02 ]a ; . . . ; ½sx ; r0nB ]a ðsx 2 SA - fMB gÞ into ½sx ; MB ]a . It is
obvious that
nB (
X
[
J )
(
)
p sx ; r0i a ¼ p ½sx ; MB ]a :

ð23Þ

i¼1

The mutual information IðX; Y Þ is a concave function of
pðxÞ for fixed pðyjxÞ. From Jensen’s inequality [27], we can
infer that the mutual information between channel v1 ’s
input and output will be no less than the mutual
information between channel v2 ’s input and output.
Therefore, the capacity of channel v1 , denoted as Cv1 , is
no less than the capacity of channel v2 , denoted as Cv2 .
Furthermore, we can extend the output symbols of
channel v2 . The extension is described as follows: 1) extend

½sx ; MB ]s t o ½sx ; r01 ]a ; ½sx ; r02 ]a ; . . . ; ½sx ; r0nB ]a , 2 ) e x t e n d
0
; ry ]s , and 3) extend
½MB ; ry ]s to ½s01 ; ry ]s ; ½s02 ; ry ]s ; . . . ; ½sm
B
½MB ; MB ]s to f½s; r] : s 2 SB - fMA g; r 2 RB - fMA gg.
We can construct channel v3 as follows: Its input
symbols are the output symbols of channel v2 , and its
output symbols are the extended output symbols of
channel v2 . Clearly, the transition probabilities of
channel v3 are determined by the anonymity attack on
mix MB . Thus, channel v3 ’s output is determined by
channel v3 ’s input, and it is independent of channel v2 ’s
input given channel v3 ’s input. Therefore, we have the
Markov Chain: channel v2 ’s input ! channel v2 ’s output,
i.e., channel v3 ’s input ! channel v3 ’s output.
According to the data processing inequality [27], the
mutual information between channel v2 ’s input and
channel v2 ’s output will be no less than the mutual
information between channel v2 ’s input and channel v3 ’s
output. We can create a channel v4 whose input is
channel v2 ’s input and whose output is channel v3 ’s
output. By construction, the capacity Cv4 of channel v4
will be no greater than Cv2 , the capacity of the channel v2 .
So far, we have
CA > Cv1 > Cv2 > Cv4

Cv4 ¼

)

I ½si ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s ;
P max
pð½si ;rj ]a Þ¼1

ð25Þ

S

f½MB ;MB ]g

S
S
where su 2 SA SB -fMA ; MB g, rv 2 RA RB -fMA ; MB g,
and SB ¼ fs01 ; s02 ; . . . ; s0mB ; MA g.
Clearly, the output symbols of channel v4 are the same
as the output symbols of channel ccðfMA ; MB gÞ, which is
built on the supermix. The input symbols of channel v4
contain a part of the input symbols of channels
ccðfMA ; MB gÞ and ½MB ; MB ]a .
Similarly, we can get
(
)
CB >
I ½si ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s ;
ð26Þ
P max
pð½si ;rj ]a Þ¼1
½si ;rj ]a 2I 0
2
S
f½MA ;MA ]g

S
where I20 ¼ f½s; r]a : s 2 SB -MA ; r 2 RA RB -fMA ; MB gg,
and SB ¼ fs10 ; s02 ; · · · ; s0mB ; MA g. The other part of the
input symbols ccðfMA ; MB gÞ is included in I20 .
The capacity of channel ccðfMA ; MB gÞ is
(
)
I ½si ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s
Cs ¼ P max
pð½sl ;rj ]a Þ¼1

S

½sl ;rj ]a 2
I0
2

�

(
)
I ½si ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s
P max
S pð½si ;rj ]a Þ¼1

ð27Þ

½si ;rj ]a 2I2
f½MB ;MB ]a g

þ

(
)
I ½s0i ; rj ]a ; ½su ; rv ]s
P max 0
S pð½si ;rj ]a Þ¼1
0

ð28Þ

½s0 ;rj ]a 2I
i
2
f½MA ;MA ]a g

� CA þ CB :

a

f½MB ;MB ]g

½si ;rj ]a2I2

X

ð29Þ

f½MA ;MA ]g

(
)
p ½MB ; MB ]a ; ½si ; rj ]s

½si ;rj ]s 2O2

· log

X (

>

½si ;rj ]s 2O2

· log

(
)
p ½MB ; MB ]a ; ½si ; rj ]s
(
)
p ½MB ; MB ]a Þpð½si ; rj ]s

pð½MB ; MB ]a ; ½si ; rj ]s

P

½si ;rj ]s 2O2

P

½si ;rj ]s 2O2

!

ð30Þ

)

(
)
p ½MB ; MB ]a ; ½si ; rj ]s

ð31Þ

(
)
p ½MB ; MB ]a Þpð½si ; rj ]s

¼ 0;

½si ;rj ]a 2I2

I2

½si ;rj ]a2I2

pð½s0 ; rj ]a Þ ¼ 1 i n c l u d e s t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n r a n g e
P i
S 0 pð½sl ; rj ] Þ ¼ 1. Second, according to the log
a
½sl ;rj ]a 2I2
I2
sum inequality [27],

ð24Þ

and
(

The inequality between (27) and (28) holds because of two
reasons: First, the maximization range comprising of
P
P
S
S
pð½si ; rj ] Þ ¼ 1 and
0
0

ð32Þ

where O2 is the set of output symbols of channels v4
and ccðfMA ; MB gÞ. Adding nonnegative terms will not
change the direction of the inequality. From (28) to (29),
inequalities (24) and (26) and (25) are used.
u
t
By extending the two-mix case in Lemma 3, we obtain
the following lemma:
Lemma 4. For two mixes connected with more than one link, the
capacity of the covert channel built on the supermix
ccðfMA ; MB gÞ will be no greater than CA þ CB .
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3. Instead of only one
path between MA and MB , there are several such paths.
This will not affect the validity of the inequalities employed
in the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 2. In a mix network of K mixes, the sum of the
capacities of all the
P covert channels in the mix network will be
no greater than K
h¼1 Ch .
Proof. This theorem can be proved by induction on K mixes
with the help of Lemma 4, as any set of K þ 1 mixes can be
partitioned into a supermix of K mixes and a single mix.t
u

7.2 Relationship
Similar to the single-mix case in Section 5, we are
interested in how bounds on the achievable anonymity
degree are affected by the covert-channel capacity of the
system and vice versa. For example, it is obvious that an
upper bound on the anonymity degree will result in a
lower bound on the total covert-channel capacity, follow
ing the observation that anonymity attacks are more
effective in less anonymous mixes.
The upper bound Dupper on the anonymity gives rise to a
lower bound Clower on the sum of the local channel capacities:
!
K
X
ð33Þ
Ch :
Clower ¼ min
n¼1

TABLE 1
Path of the Actual Communications

Fig. 9. An example mix network.

Equation (33) gives rise to a minimization problem over
anonymity attack results ph ð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ, with the fol
lowing three constrains. First, the local a priori probabilities
for communications at each mix Mh must sum to one:
mh X
nh
X

(
)
ph ½si ; rj ]a ¼ 1:

ð34Þ

i¼1 j¼1

Second, the transition probability from each input symbol
½si ; rj ]a of each mix should sum up to one:
nh
mh X
X

(
)
ph ½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a ¼ 1:

ð35Þ

u¼1 v¼1

Third, the anonymity of the system, as computed in
Section 6.1, should not exceed Dupper .
We can solve this constrained optimization problem
analytically by using Lagrange multipliers and KuhnTucker conditions or by using numerical methods such as
Monte Carlo.
Similarly, given upper bound Cupper on the total covertchannel capacity of the mix network, we would like to find
out a lower bound Dlower for the anonymity degree of the
mix network.
The objective function becomes
(
)
I ½SM ; RM ]a ; ½SM ; RM ]s
Dlower ¼ min 1 :
ð36Þ
logðm · nÞ
This optimization problem is over all possible anonymity
attack results ph ð½su ; rv ]s j½si ; rj ]a Þ. Constraints (34) and (35)
still hold in this case. The new constraint is
Cupper >

K
X

Ch :

ð37Þ

h¼1

8

EVALUATION

We use the mix network shown in Fig. 9 as an example to
illustrate the relationships established in the previous
section. We choose six mixes because it is a nontrivial
topology, and both a mix cascade and a stratified network
[28] can be established on the six mixes.
We assume that communications between each senderreceiver pair have the same a priori probability (alterna
tively, the same share of total traffic volume). Since there are
two senders and two receivers, we have four senderreceiver pairs. The actual path for communication ½si ; rj ]a is
shown in Table 1 if the actual path is not specified and the
path is possible in the topology. For our examples, we use

adaptive simulated annealing to solve the optimization
problem to establish Dlower from a known bound on the mix
network capacity.
The following measurements focus on the impact of
parameters of the anonymity network. Parameters that are
extraneous to the network proper (for example, the number
of concurrent users) are not measured.
Impact of the connectivity. Obviously, the connectivity
will affect the anonymity degree in a mix network. In our
first set of examples, the base topology contains only the
solid lines in Fig. 9. Then, edges are incrementally added to
the base topology in the order of the label assigned to each
edge. The average degrees of the topologies, including the
16
20
base topology, are 2, 14
6 , 6 , 3, and 6 , respectively.
For every mix in the base topology, there is only one
input link and one output link. Therefore, there is only one
sender receiver pair for the mix in the base topology. A
channel with only one input symbol and one output symbol
has capacity zero. Therefore, the capacity Csum is zero for
the base topology.
In Fig. 10a, we first observe that the lower bound of the
anonymity degree decreases with increasing bound on the
capacity, just as expected. In addition, the capacity Csum
increases with increasing connectivity. For a given upper
bound of the capacity Csum , increasing connectivity will
increase the anonymity degree. Third, we can observe that
there is large gap between the base topology and the
topology of the next higher average degree. This is because
adding the edge of label 1 will connect s1 and r2 , and
communication ½s1 ; r2 ]a can be suspected as ½s1 ; r1 ]s . Therefore, the initial edge added to the topology can increase the
anonymity degree significantly. In comparison, the effect of
adding an edge with label 4 is marginal.
Effect of adding different edges. In the second set of
examples, we use the solid lines and edge with label 1 as the
base topology. Then, we add one more edge, with label 2, 3,
or 4, to the base topology. We label the new topologies as A,
B, and C, respectively. Clearly, these topologies are of
the same average degree. In Fig. 10b, we observe that the
anonymity degree increase caused by the addition of the
edge with label 3 is smaller than that for the other two
edges. This is because adding the other two edges can make
communication ½s2 ; r1 ]a possible, and communication
½s2 ; r1 ]a can be suspected as some other communication.
Effect of path selection. In this set of examples, we focus
on the topology containing all the solid and dashed lines
except the edge with label 3. We consider two cases. In one
case, the actual path for communication ½s2 ; r1 ]a follows
path A, as in Table 1. In the other case, the actual path B for
communication ½s2 ; r1 ]a is s1 ! M2 ! M3 ! M5 ! r1 .

Fig. 10. Effect of topology. (a) Impact of the connectivity. (b) Effect of adding different edges. (c) Effect of path selection.

We observe that the use of mix M3 will slightly increase
the anonymity in Fig. 10c. This is because mix M3 has more
input and output links than the other mixes. Communica
tions that use mix M3 are thus easier to hide. In general, the
rather minor effect of path selection measured in this
experiment reflects the fact that the underlying mix net
work is rather homogeneous, in terms of both symmetry of
topology and “quality” of the nodes.
The interested reader may be missing an evaluation that
measures the effect of the size of the user population at this
point. As we indicated in the introduction, in this paper, we
attempt to capture the inherent quality of the anonymity
network and leave the effect of user population size
reflected in the per-mix information leakage capacity.
In practice, in order to better construct an anonymity
network, first, it is important to have a rich connectivity in
the network. Second, given similar connectivity in anonym
ity networks, the topology will affect the “quality” of the
anonymity network. Finally, the effect of path selection is
minor when the network is homogeneous in terms of
symmetry of topology and “quality” of the nodes.
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SUMMARY

AND

FUTURE WORK

Nodes in anonymity networks are inherently heteroge
neous: platforms can vary. The expertise of their operators
varies widely as well, and so does the exposure to misuse.
Similarly, the connectivity of nodes is also not uniform. In
addition, the types of attacks and their effects on the
anonymity of the system cannot be predicted. This all
makes it very difficult for designers of anonymity protocols
and operators and users of anonymity systems to assess the
effectiveness of the system. In this paper, we proposed a
generic information-theoretic measure for the anonymity
degree. This simple measure ranges between zero and one
to indicate the overall effectiveness of the mix network as a
whole. Our work is the first to develop a relationship
between the anonymity degree and the capacity of
anonymity-based covert channels. In the mix-network case,
this relationship is described in a scenario-oriented fashion.
What is needed is a set of rules to map and cluster arbitrary
networks into supermixes and clouds. Further research will
focus on multicast or broadcast channels in the anonymity
network and their effect on the anonymity degree. Finally,
we need to extend the work from anonymity-based covert
channels to general covert channels in mix networks, such
as the nonanonymity-based covert channels described in

[13], [21], and [22] or other formalizations of information
leakage-based attacks. Eventually, a conclusion is needed
that allows the aggregation attacks and the formulation of
the level of anonymity provided by systems with less-than
perfect components.
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